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Knight-Ridder Broadcasting v. Greenberg:
Is the Judiciary Making Policy?
I. Introduction
The struggle to establish a privilege to protect both journal-
istic1 sources and information from compulsory disclosure repre-
sents the conflict between the well-established tenet that every
competent person should testify2 and the constitutional concern
for the free flow of information to the public.' The battle has
been arduous, but through the machinery of the state legisla-
tures, journalists have been advancing their cause. The majority
of states have enacted shield laws" protecting newsmen from
compulsory process to reveal their sources and the information
they obtain in their quest for news. But the battle is not yet
won. The controversy wages on between the judiciary and jour-
nalists as to whether these statutes extend their protection not
merely to confidential, but to nonconfidential sources and infor-
mation, as well.
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals had the opportu-
nity to construe the New York Shield Law' as one which affords
an absolute privilege against the mandatory disclosure of both
1. For this Note, terms such as "journalist," "reporter," or "newsperson" will apply
to
one who, for gain or livelihood, is engaged in gathering, preparing, collecting, writ-
ing, editing, filming, taping or photographing of news intended for a newspaper,
magazine, news agency, press association or wire service or other professional me-
dium or agency which has as one of its regular functions the processing and re-
searching of news intended for dissemination to the public; such person shall be
someone performing said function either as a regular employee or as one otherwise
professionally affiliated for gain or livelihood with such medium of
communication.
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(a)(6) (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1988).
2. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 65 (3d ed. 1940).
3. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
4. Statutes that grant newspersons the privilege to refuse to disclose sources and
information are commonly referred to as "shield laws." See, e.g., In re Farber, 78 N.J.
259, 269 n.2, 394 A.2d 330, 335 n.2, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978). See infra note 64
for a list of state shield laws.
5. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1988).
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confidential and nonconfidential information obtained in the
news gathering process. In Knight-Ridder Broadcasting v.
Greenberg," a 4-3 majority declined to do so. Instead, the court
construed the statute narrowly, holding that the protection of
the Shield Law does not extend to information obtained from
nonconfidential sources. The court also found that no first
amendment protection existed for a television news reporter's
videotaped interview that contained information pertinent to a
grand jury's investigation.8
The decision limits the protection offered by the Shield
Law, instead of allowing New York to join those states which
provide absolute protection to newsmen through a strong shield
law." Furthermore, the decision may have far-reaching effects.10
Prior to Knight-Ridder, a large number of subpoenas duces te-
cum issued to newsmen in New York had been quashed under
the Shield Law. 1 This decision, however, imposes a narrow con-
struction and, therefore, a broader range of information i" can
now be found to lie outside the statutory protection.
Part II of this Note examines the scope of the newsman's
privilege under the Constitution and at common law. Particular
attention is paid to the Supreme Court decision in Branzburg v.
Hayes13 and the applicability of its three-prong test of rele-
6. 70 N.Y.2d 151, 511 N.E.2d 1116, 518 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1987).
7. Id. at 153, 511 N.E.2d at 1117, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
8. Id. at 160, 511 N.E.2d at 1121, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 600.
9. N.Y. Times, Jul. 8, 1987, at B4, col. 3 (citing Jane Kirtley, Executive Director of
the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press). According to the article those states
affording an absolute privilege are: California, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
and Oregon. Whether the absolute privilege was granted by constitution, statute, or judi-
cial interpretation was not discussed.
10. Subpoenas hamper the effectiveness of the journalist, both personally and pro-
fessionally. The reporter cannot devote full time to reporting because he has court com-
mitments and consultations with lawyers. The reporter is also handicapped by "profes-
sionally incapacitating worry and hassle" because now he becomes a news source and
must "ironically, fend off his colleagues." Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical
Study, 70 MICH. L. REv. 229, 265 (1971).
11. N.Y. Times, Jul. 8, 1987, at B4, cols. 3-4. The percentage was higher than the
nationwide average due to uncertainty about what the Shield Law actually protected.
12. Id. at B4, cols. 1-2. The concern is that this kind of information will include
reporters' "notes, outtakes, photographs and other materials routinely used by journal-
ists." Id.




vancy, availability, and compelling interest"' to the instant case.
Part II also examines other state statutes, focusing on those
states that specifically insert confidentiality into the language of
the statute, contain no qualification, incorporate the Branzburg
test, or afford an absolute privilege. Part II concludes with an
analysis of the evolution of the New York Shield Law. The facts
of Knight-Ridder, the lower court proceedings and Judge Bel-
lacosa's dissent are discussed in Part III. Part IV analyzes the
position of the judiciary in finding a requirement of confidential-
ity where none formally existed. 5 Part V concludes that there is
a need for a strong shield law and calls upon the legislature to
clearly define the limits of the New York Shield Law.
II. Background
A. Scope of the Journalist's Privilege
1. Constitutional Foundation
a. First Amendment
The cornerstone of the newsman's argument for a right to
the protection of his communication and sources derives from
the first amendment." The Supreme Court has interpreted this
first amendment freedom of the press as a "right basic to the
existence of a democratic society. 1 1 7 Accordingly, a first amend-
ment protection has also been interpreted to encompass a right
14. Id. at 713 n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
15. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988) states in pertinent part:
"[N]o professional journalist or newscaster . . . employed or otherwise associated with
any newspaper, magazine, news agency,... shall be adjudged in contempt ... for refus-
ing or failing to disclose any news or the source of any such news coming into his posses-
sion in the course of gathering or obtaining news ...." (emphasis added).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no
law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ...." The protection of the first
amendment extends not only to the legislature, but also to executive and judiciary pro-
ceedings, and to state governments through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187-88 (1957) (concerning the constitutional lim-
its of federal legislative inquiry); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 254-55 (1957)
(concerning the constitutional limits of state legislative inquiry).
17. Note Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential
Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317, 327. See also Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233 (1936). "A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government




to publish without prior governmental consent; 8 immunity from
restraint of publication thereby encouraging circulation;' 9 and a
right to distribute,s" as well as receive,2' printed material with-
out state restrictions that would unconstitutionally impair the
exchange of information.
It follows then that the first amendment carries with it an
implicit right to gather news - a right envisioned by the fram-
ers of the Bill of Rights22 - that is basic to the idea of freedom
of the press.28 The underlying theory that news gathering is pro-
tected by the first amendment rests upon the public's first
amendment right to uninhibited access to information and
ideas .2  Therefore, newsmen argue that being subject to sub-
poena to disclose their sources would limit the information they
would be able to obtain, thereby denying "not only their free-
dom to publish, but also the public's right to receive news. '25 A
basic tenet of the first amendment is to encourage the free flow
of ideas by preventing governmental interference. Accordingly,
first amendment protection should prevent the government from
using the "media as its own private investigative force.""s
18. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
19. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250. "[An untrammeled press [is] a vital source of public
information ... and since informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints
upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free
press cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern." Id.
20. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (a state cannot impose criminal
punishment on a person for distributing religious literature on a sidewalk of a company-
owned town); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (ordinance prohibiting
door-to-door distribution of handbills declared unconstitutional).
21. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (statute requiring Postmas-
ter General to detain certain unsealed foreign mailings and deliver only on addressee's
request held to unconstitutionally limit first amendment rights).
22. 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 398 (Hunt ed. 1906). "A popular government
without popular information or the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or
tragedy or perhaps both." Id.
23. Note, supra note 17, at 328: "The right to gather material for publication has
never been explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court. However, the Court . . . has
implicitly acknowledged the existence of a general right to gather information." Id.
24. For an in-depth discussion of the access doctrine, which is beyond the scope of
this Note, see Barron, Access to the Press - A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1641 (1967).
25. Comment, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg: The Case for a Federal
Shield Law, 24 UCLA L. REV. 160, 170 (1976).
26. Monk, Evidentiary Privilege for Journalists' Sources: Theory and Statutory




Indeed, this first amendment theory has been tested in the
courts, initially in Garland v. Torre." Judy Garland had brought
the suit, contending that statements made in a column written
by a New York Herald Tribune columnist, Marie Torre, were
defamatory. The statements were allegedly attributed to an
anonymous CBS executive, and several attempts to uncover the
identity of the executive were thwarted. Torre refused to dis-
close the identity of her source on the grounds that this disclo-
sure would ultimately limit the availability of news both to the
reporter and to the public, and would deny her freedom of the
press.2 a Justice Potter Stewart, then a judge on the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, acknowledged that disclosure of confiden-
tial sources could infringe upon freedom of the press by limiting
the availability of news.2 ' The court asserted, however, that free-
dom of the press is not absolute ana must be balanced against
the duty to testify." In Torre, the relevance of the material in
question went to the "heart of the plaintiff's claim" and, there-
fore, the duty to testify was of overriding importance.31
Following the Torre decision, several cases recognized a
qualified first amendment privilege, but a majority of those
courts refused to extend such a privilege to newsmen.2 Torre
was a precursor to the balancing test that would subsequently
27. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
28. Id. at 547-48.
29. Id.
30. Justice Stewart partially agreed with this interpretation of the first amendment:
[C]ompulsory disclosure of a journalist's confidential sources of information may
entail an abridgement of press freedom by imposing some limitation upon the
availability of news.
... But freedom of the press.., is not an absolute. What must be determined
is whether the interest to be served by compelling the testimony of the witness...
justifies some impairment of this First Amendment freedom.
Id..
31. Id. at 550.
32. See, e.g., State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93 (1971) (where newspa-
per editor received information under a cloak of confidentiality, court held there is a
constitutional privilege not to disclose unless overridden by the public's compelling need
to know); State v. Buchanan, 250 Or. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968)
(where student editor refused to disclose the identity of her source, court held no consti-
tutional protection compels recognition of a privilege to withhold evidence); In re Taylor,
412 Pa. 32, 41, 193 A.2d 181, 185 (1963) (the court took judicial notice that "important
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become the constitutional standard.3 3 Under the first amend-
ment, a newsman will not be compelled to disclose confidential
information unless balancing shows that the overriding national
interest is greater than the need to protect a confidential
relationship.
b. Fifth Amendment
The fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination
has been propounded as another theory for the protection
against source or information disclosure. 4 This protection
against self-incrimination is invoked where a newsman's refusal
to testify could subject him to a charge of misprision,"s or to a
charge of obstruction of justice for aiding criminals by withhold-
ing information. Where there is no danger that the newsman will
33. The seminal case, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), held, in effect, that
the newsman has a privilege under the first amendment not to disclose confidential
sources or information to a grand jury until an overriding or compelling interest in this
testimony is established. Id. at 708.
34. See, e.g., Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915). Burdick, the city editor
of the New York Tribune, appeared before the grand jury and refused to answer ques-
tions regarding his sources of information for an article on customs fraud, on the grounds
that the answers might be self-incriminating. Although a presidential pardon was ob-
tained by the United States Attorney seeking to compel this testimony, the newsman
continued his refusal to answer on the same grounds. The Supreme Court held that Bur-
dick could refuse the pardon and that Burdick's fifth amendment claim did not imply a
confession, but rather that his testimony might tend to incriminate him and, therefore,
qualified for the fifth amendment protection. Id. at 93-95. See also Curtin v. United
States, 236 U.S. 96 (1915) (reporter who wrote article at issue in Burdick was also
granted fifth amendment protection).
35. Misprision is "[a] word used to describe an offense which does not possess a
specific name . . . and . . . denotes ... a contempt against the . . . government .
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 902 (5th ed. 1979).
Misprision of felony is
[t]he offense of concealing a felony committed by another, but without such previ-
ous concert with or subsequent assistance to the felon as would make the party
concealing an accessory before or after the fact.
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable
by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make
known the same to some judge or other person in ... authority ... is guilty of the
federal crime of misprision of felony.
Id. at 902-03 (citations omitted).
In noting this potential liability, the Supreme Court stated, "[h]istorically, the com-
mon law recognized a duty to raise the 'hue and cry' and report felonies to the authori-
ties. Misprision of a felony ... was often said to be a common-law crime." Branzburg,
408 U.S. at 696 (footnote omitted).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss2/6
KNIGHT-RIDDER BROADCASTING
be implicated as having committed a crime, however, newsmen
have been denied fifth amendment protection.3" This protection
will also be denied when the reporter refuses to disclose enough
information for the court to make a determination as to whether
the fifth amendment is properly invoked. 7 Because proceedings
do not always involve criminal cases, fifth amendment protec-
tion is virtually useless in protecting newsmen from the
mandatory disclosure of sources or information in civil
litigation.38
2. Judicial Interpretation
The first reported privilege case in the United States dates
back to 1848, when John Nugent, a news reporter with the New
York Herald, refused to reveal his source in response to a sub-
poena by the United States Senate." At that time, the Senate
was in secret session debating a treaty to end the Mexican-
American War. Nugent obtained copies of confidential docu-
ments, including a secret draft of the treaty, which he sent to his
editor. 0 The reporter was imprisoned for contempt of Con-
gress." ' It is unclear whether Nugent ever revealed his
source - but it is very clear that the controversy over the
newsman's privilege had begun.
a. Rejection of a Common-Law Privilege
At common law, for a privilege against disclosure of commu-
nications to be granted, four basic requirements had to be
satisfied:
36. Ex parte Holliway, 272 Mo. 108, 199 S.W. 412 (1917) (protection against self-
incrimination can only be used where the tendency to incriminate actually exists; not to
merely escape answering).
37. See, e.g., Elwell v. United States, 275 F. 775 (7th Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 257
U.S. 647 (1921) (court decides from the circumstances of the case and the nature of the
evidence the witness will present whether fifth amendment protection applies; not for
the witness' discretion).
38. The fifth amendment states in pertinent part: "No person shall be held to an-
swer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime.., nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
39. Ex parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471 (D.C. Cir. 1848).
40. See Comment, supra note 25, at 161.
41. 18 F. Cas. at 483.
19881
7
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:427
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed;
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties;
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the com-
munity ought to be sedulously fostered; and
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure
of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation. "2
Because it was normally impossible to meet all of these criteria,
no common-law privilege was available for the protection of a
journalist's sources and information.4 The courts, having ad-
dressed the issue of whether a common-law privilege protecting
the disclosure of sources or information extended to journalists,
decided that it did not. Reporters also tried to establish a com-
mon-law privilege predicated on potential injury to the journal-
ists career," but courts have uniformly rejected this approach.4
People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New York County46 is
most often cited as the leading case rejecting a common-law
42. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285, at 531 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis in original).
43. Id. at § 2286, at 533-34. "Accordingly, a confidential communication ... to a...
journalist ... is not privileged from disclosure." Id.
44. See Note, Beach v. Shanley: An Expansive Interpretation of New York's
"Shield Law," 49 ALB. L. REV. 748 (1985). See also Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70
S.E. 781 (1911). In Plunkett, a reporter was subpoenaed to testify as to information
received from a police officer. The reporter refused, claiming he would be subjected to
ridicule, contempt and would lose his job as a result. Id. at 81, 70 S.E. at 785. The court
held these arguments to be without merit and found no privilege to protect the reporter
from revealing the information. Id.
45. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Carroll, 99 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (prevailing rule
is that a newspaper correspondent must answer pertinent questions and disclose the
sources of his information unless the communication derives from a confidential relation-
ship); Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957) (reporter
has no privilege protecting the disclosure of his source of information in the absence of a
statute); Ex parte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 P. 124 (1897) (editor and reporter held in
contempt for failing to reveal sources relevant and pertinent to a state senate investiga-
tion); Joslyn v. People, 67 Colo. 297, 184 P. 375 (1919) (owner of newspaper may not
refuse to testify or claim privilege because he considers the matter inquired about his
private, confidential and personal business).
46. 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936). A reporter was subpoenaed after making alle-
gations that gambling and lottery racketeering activities continued despite grand jury
investigations. The reporter refused to give names and addresses of persons mentioned
in the article. Id. at 293, 199 N.E. at 415.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss2/6
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privilege.47 In Mooney, the New York Court of Appeals held that
a reporter, subpoenaed by a grand jury, could not refuse to tes-
tify regarding statements made to him on a claim that these
communications were privileged. Again, the court overlooked the
claim of possible harm to the journalist's career in denying the
privilege. The underlying rationale for the court's steadfast ad-
herence to a refusal to grant the privilege is the evidentiary
principle that every person should testify.4 8
b. Branzburg v. Hayes
In their quest for a common-law privilege, newsmen at first
sought to protect only the identity of their sources. But with
greater reliance on off-the-record information in the preparation
of news stories, journalists have endeavored to include confiden-
tial information in the scope of the privilege they are trying to
establish."" This assertion has been grounded in the first amend-
ment right of the public to be informed, and on the practical
fear that the supply of information from informants will dry
up.50 Nevertheless, with the Supreme Court's decision in
Branzburg v. Hayes,51 the existence of a common-law privilege
47. See Comment, supra, note 25, at 166 n.34.
48. Mooney, 269 N.Y. at 295, 199 N.E. at 416. "The tendency is not to extend the
classes to whom the privilege from disclosure is granted, but to restrict that privilege."
Id. See also 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 2192 at 64 ("[Tjhe public ... has a right to
every man's evidence.").
49. See Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
50.
The relationship [between a reporter and his source] depends upon trust and con-
fidence ... [and] depends in turn on actual knowledge of how news and informa-
tion imparted have been handled ....
This reassurance disappears when the reporter is called to testify behind
closed doors .... [This] necessarily introduces uncertainty in the minds of those
who fear a betrayal of their confidences.
Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1088.
51. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). This decision represents a consolidation of: Caldwell v.
United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (first amendment provides a qualified testimonial privilege
to newsmen, and absent compelling reasons for requiring his testimony, he was held
privileged to withhold it); Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971) (statute con-
strued as not affording newsman privilege not to testify about events he had observed
personally); and In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971) (there is no consti-
tutional newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute, to refuse to testify before a
court or grand jury).
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was emphatically denied.
The Branzburg Court rejected a first amendment testimo-
nial privilege for newsmen and held that a grand jury may re-
quire a reporter to breach a promise of confidentiality to a
source if the grand jury is investigating a crime the source is
alleged to have witnessed.52 The Court acknowledged the legiti-
mate concern of reporters regarding the likely impact of a lack
of testimonial privilege on the flow of news,5s but found that the
government's compelling interest in pursuing and prosecuting
criminals took precedence. First amendment protection did en-
compass news gathering, but it was counterbalanced by the com-
pelling relevancy of the information to a grand jury investiga-
tion." Asserting that at common law "courts consistently refuse
to recognize the existence of any privilege authorizing a news-
man to refuse to reveal confidential information to a grand
Petitioners Branzburg and Pappas, and respondent Caldwell asserted that in order
to gather news
it is often necessary to agree either not to identify the source of information pub-
lished or to publish only part of the facts revealed, or both ... and that the
reporter should not be forced either to appear or to testify before a grand jury or
at trial until and unless sufficient grounds are shown for believing that the re-
porter possesses information relevant to a crime the grand jury is investigating,
that the information the reporter has is unavailable from other sources, and that
the need for the information is sufficiently compelling to override the claimed in-
vasion of First Amendment interests occasioned by the disclosure.
408 U.S. at 679-80.
52. Id. at 692. Justice White, in his majority opinion, stated:
[W]e cannot seriously entertain the notion that the First Amendment protects a
newsman's agreement to conceal the criminal conduct of his source, or evidence
thereof, on the theory that it is better to write about crime than to do something
about it. Insofar as any reporter in these cases undertook not to reveal or testify
about the crime he witnessed, his claim of privilege under the First Amendment
presents no substantial question. The crimes of news sources are no less reprehen-
sible and threatening to the public interest when witnessed by a reporter than
when they are not.
Id.
53. Id. at 693. "The argument that the flow of news will be diminished by compel-
ling reporters to aid the grand jury in a criminal investigation is not irrational ...." Id.
54. Id. at 700.
[T]he investigation of crime by the grand jury implements a fundamental govern-
mental role of securing the safety of the person and property of the citizen, and it
appears to us that calling reporters to give testimony in the manner and for the
reasons that other citizens are called "bears a reasonable relationship to the
achievement of the governmental purpose asserted as its justification."
Id. (quoting Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 525 (1960)).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss2/6
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jury,"65 the Court could find no basis to override the "public in-
terest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury
proceedings" in favor of the "consequential, but uncertain, bur-
den on news gathering that is said to result from insisting that
reporters, like other citizens, respond to . . . a valid grand jury
investigation or criminal trial."5
In his concurrence, Justice Powell emphasized that the deci-
sion was limited to situations where a newsman is called before a
grand jury and when the issue is the newsman's right to a confi-
dential relationship.5 7 The newsman could still resort to the
courts "where legitimate First Amendment interests require pro-
tection,"5 8 and in each case, the court should strike a "proper
balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all
citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal
conduct. 59
Justice Stewart, in a dissent joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, found that the right to gather news implicitly encom-
passes "a right to a confidential relationship between a reporter
and his source." 0 In arguing that the Court should adopt a qual-
ified privilege for journalists faced with subpoenas, Justice Stew-
art also articulated a three-pronged test for determining when
the privilege should be denied:
the government must (1) show that there is probable cause to be-
lieve that the newsman has information that is clearly relevant to
a specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the in-
formation sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less
destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a
compelling and overriding interest in the information."
55. Id. at 685.
56. Id. at 690.
57. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 710. Justice Powell delineated a broad scope for newsmen to have access
to the courts to assert their first amendment privilege.
[I]f the newsman is called upon to give information bearing only a remote and
tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation, or if he has some other
reason to believe that his testimony implicates confidential source relationships
without a legitimate need of law enforcement, he will have access to the court on a
motion to quash and an appropriate protective order may be entered.
Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 743 (citation omitted).
1988]
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In the absence of such a qualified privilege, Justice Stewart
voiced his apprehension that the flow of news to the public
would be curtailed.2
Although Branzburg is the ultimate death knell to the crea-
tion of a common-law privilege for newsmen and their confiden-
tial relationships, the Court did not preclude a state from grant-
ing an absolute privilege under its own state shield law."
B. General Evolution of State Shield Laws
A majority of states6 ' have adopted some form of shield law
that explicitly delineates who holds the privilege and the types
of media protected. 5 However, the scope of the protection pro-
vided under these statutes varies.6
62. Id. at 736. "[W~e cannot escape the conclusion that when neither the reporter
nor his source can rely on the shield of confidentiality against unrestrained use of the
grand jury's subpoena power, valuable information will not be published and the public
dialogue will inevitably be impoverished." Id.
63. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706.
64. ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1986); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150 to 09.25.220 (1987);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-85-510 (1987); CAL. EvID.
CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1988) and CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§
4320-4326 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-901 to 8-909 § 8-907-90 (Smith-Hurd
1984 & Supp. 1987), IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
421.100 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 45:1451 to 45:1454 (West 1982); MD. CTS.
& JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a (West
1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021 to 595.025 (West Supp. 1988); MONT. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 26-1-901 to 26-1-903 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to 20-147 (1983); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 49.275 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to 2A:84A-21.13 (West Supp. 1987);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (1984); N.M.R. EviD. 514 (eff. Nov. 1, 1982); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS
LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, 2739.12 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506 (1980); OR.
REV. STAT. §9 44.510 to 44.540 (1987); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4942 (Purdon, 1982); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-1 to 9-19.1-3 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980).
65. For an in-depth analysis of the language of the statutes, see Monk, Evidentiary
Privilege for Journalists' Sources: Theory and Statutory Protection, 51 Mo. L. REV. 1,
26-34 (1986). See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1986), which states in pertinent part:
No person engaged in, connected with or employed on any newspaper, radio
broadcasting station or television station, while engaged in a news-gathering ca-
pacity, shall be compelled to disclose ... the sources of any information procured
or obtained by him and published in the newspaper, broadcast by any broadcast-
ing station, or televised by any television station on which he is engaged, con-
nected with or employed.
Id.
66. In some states that have no shield law, a qualified privilege has been adopted
through the state or federal courts. See, e.g., Altemose Const. v. Building & Const.
Trades Council, 443 F. Supp. 489 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (no absolute privilege protects news-
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1. Statutes Having No Confidentiality Requirements
Some statutes protect the source's identity, but not the in-
formation conveyed, based on the rationale that nondis-
seminated information should not be protected.67 Even though
these statutes protect only sources, some courts have construed
these laws to imply a qualified privilege against disclosure of in-
formation.6 8 In Arizona, the legislature enacted additional legis-
lation that appears to broaden the original statute's coverage to
include information, as well as the source, within its pro-
men; the asserted claim to privilege should be judged on an ad hoc basis since first
amendment interests usually outweigh the public's interest in civil proceedings). See also
In re Roche, 411 N.E.2d 466 (Mass. 1980) (first amendment does not grant reporter priv-
ilege not to testify if the information sought is relevant, and not otherwise available).
Other states have incorporated an absolute privilege into the constitution. See, e.g.,
Wright v. Kiss, 108 Idaho 418, 700 P.2d 40 (1985) (interpreting U.S. CONST. amend. I and
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 9 to provide a qualified privilege to newsmen, and applies a balanc-
ing test similar to the one used in Branzburg). California amended its constitution, CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 2, to make the shield law a constitutional provision in order to curb the
antishield decisions. Monk, Evidentiary Privilege for Journalists' Sources, supra note
65, at 46-47.
67. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1986) and supra note 65; ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.150
(1983) ("[N]o ... reporter may be compelled to disclose the source of information");
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1982) ("the source of information"); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
16-85-510 (1977) ("the source of information used"); ILL. ANN. STAT. § 8-901 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1987) ("source of information"); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns 1986)
("the source of any information procured"); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Bobbs-Mer-
rill 1972) ("the source of any information procured"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:1452
(West 1982) ("the identity of any informant or any source of information obtained");
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (Supp. 1987) ("the source of any news or
information . . . obtained"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.04, 2739.12 (Page 1981) ("any
information procured"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942(a) (Purdon 1982) ("the source of
any information procured"). These statutes have also been interpreted by courts as pro-
tecting only the source. See, e.g., Williams v. American Broadcasting Cos., 96 F.R.D. 658,
665 (W.D. Ark. 1983) ("statute, by its own terms, applies only so as to protect 'the
source' "); Dumez v. Houma Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 341 So.2d 1206, 1208
(La. 1976), cert. denied, 344 So.2d 667 (La. 1977) (shield law grants a privilege from
disclosing the source of the information not against disclosing the information itself).
68. See, e.g., Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 279 (3d Cir. 1980)
(Pennsylvania shield law held to protect outtakes even though the identity of the source
was known); Illinois v. Johnson, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1101 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County
Oct. 22, 1984) (there is a qualified protection for disclosure of information under the
Illinois Shield Law). The courts, however, are not consistent in their interpretation. In
Gutierrez v. Shafer, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1054, 1055 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County Aug.
18, 1982), the court found a qualified privilege against disclosing information, based on
the first amendment. The court acknowledged that a different result could arise under
the shield law, which only protects against the disclosure of the source.
1988]
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tection.6 9
Other statutes specifically protect both the source and the
information.7 0 Michigan's statute is the most expansive in pro-
viding that "communications between reporters of newspapers
or other publications and their informants are hereby declared
to be privileged and confidential. '71 With few exceptions, these
shield laws have no requirement of confidentiality on their
face. 2
2. Statutes Specifically Requiring Confidentiality
Traditionally, the law of privilege covers only communica-
tions in situations where a confidential relationship exists.7 3 Yet
of the twenty-six states with shield laws,74 only three expressly
require confidentiality as a prerequisite to the news media's
privileges.75 While the public policy of Minnesota's shield law
69. See Monk, supra at 51 n.268. The point is made that the ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12-2237 (1982), which protects only the "source of information" appears to broaden its
scope when read in conjunction with ARIZ. STAT. ANN. § 12-2214(A) (Supp. 1987), entitled
"Requirements for subpoena of media witnesses." This provision requires that six crite-
ria be satisfied if the subpoena is to have effect. These requirements include a showing
that the information: is unavailable from other sources, including an identification of
which sources were investigated; the information is relevant and material to the person's
cause of action; and that there is no intent to interfere with news gathering processes. Id.
70. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1988); MICH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 767.5a
(West 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021 to 595.025 (West Supp. 1988); MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to 26-1-903 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to 20-147 (1983);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to 2A:84A-21.13 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-
6-7 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney
1986 & Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506 (1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520 (1987); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-2 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980).
71. MICH. COmP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a (West 1982). The statute does not require a
confidential relationship to exist. The statute deems the communication to be
confidential.
72. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.022 (West Supp. 1988): "[T]he freedom of press
requires protection of the confidential relationship between the news gatherer and the
source of information." Again, the statute does not seem to require a confidential rela-
tionship, but instead deems one to be created. This language is ambiguous, as was noted
by the state trial court in Aerial Burials v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune, 8 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1653-54 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. Apr. 15, 1982), where the statute was inter-
preted to encompass "unpublished information regardless of whether the source is
known or will be identified if such information is revealed." Id. See also infra note 75.
73. See J. WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 2285 at 531. "The communications must origi-
nate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed .... (emphasis in original).
74. See supra note 64.
75. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4322 (1975); N.M.R. EvIn. 514 (eff. Nov. 1, 1982);
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indicates that its purpose "is to ensure and perpetuate . . . the
confidential relationship between the news media and its
sources," 76 an explicit or implied understanding of confidential-
ity is not a prerequisite to invoking the statute's protection. In
comparison, Delaware requires a statement, under oath, that "an
express or implied understanding" of confidentiality existed
originally between the reporter and his source." However, no
such understanding is required for nonadjudicative procedures
in that state.78 Rhode Island places great emphasis on the confi-
dential relationship by designating a "confidential association" 79
or "confidential information ' 8° as within the scope of the stat-
ute's protection. Confidentiality is a prerequisite to invoking the
privilege in all proceedings."' The statute further reinforces the
confidentiality requirement by providing for the waiver of the
privilege when the information obtained is made public.8 2
3. Statutes Incorporating the Branzburg Test
Many of the state legislatures specifically qualified the
broad language of their statutes by including provisions that
adopt either the Branzburg test" or some modification.8 " The
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-2 (1985).
76. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.022 (West Supp. 1988).
77. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4322 (1975):
A reporter is privileged in an adjudicative proceeding to decline to testify concern-
ing the source or content of information ... if he states under oath that the disclo-
sure of the information would violate an express or implied understanding with
the source under which the information was originally obtained or would substan-
tially hinder the reporter in the maintenance of existing source relationships or
the development of new source relationships.
Id.
78. Id. § 4321.
79. RI. Gen. Laws § 9-19.1-2 (1985). "[N]o person shall be required ... to reveal a
confidential association, to disclose any confidential information or to disclose the source
of any confidential information received .... Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. But cf. N.M.R. EvID. 514 (eff. Nov. 1, 1982). Confidentiality is only a prere-
quisite for privilege in judicial proceedings.
82. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-3(a) (1985). "The privilege conferred by § 9-19.1-2 shall
not apply to any information which has at any time been published, broadcast, or other-
wise made public by the person claiming the privilege." Id.
83. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2214(A)(2), (4) (Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE




three-pronged test for denial of the privilege requires a showing
of relevancy to a probable violation of law, unavailability from
alternative sources, and a compelling and overriding interest in
the information. The test or its modification is generally ap-
plied when the subpoenaing party seeks to discover material
that the newsman claims is protected by privilege. It is then up
to the discretion of the judge to determine whether the party
seeking the information has met its burden by making the requi-
site showing. 6
a. Total Incorporation of the Three-Pronged Test
Tennessee, which employs the full Branzburg test, requires
a showing by clear and convincing evidence. 7 Delaware limits
the application of the three-pronged test to adjudicative pro-
ceedings." Its statute, however, provides an unqualified privilege
to protect the reporter from testifying as to his source, and only
a qualified privilege as to the content.8 9 Under the Delaware
statute, the judge determines whether the "public interest in
having the reporter's testimony outweighs the public interest in
keeping the information confidential." 90 In making this determi-
nation, the judge examines such factors as the relevance of the
ANN. § 2A:84A-21.3 (West Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506(B)(2) (1980); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 9-19.1-3 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980).
85. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
86. TENN, CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980).
The application shall be granted only if the court after hearing the parties deter-
mines that the person seeking the information has shown by clear and convincing
evidence that:
(A) There is probable cause to believe that the person from whom the infor-
mation is sought has information which is clearly relevant to a specific probable
violation of law;
(B) The person has demonstrated that the information sought cannot reason-
ably be obtained by alternative means; and
(C) The person has demonstrated a compelling and overriding public interest
of the people of the state of Tennessee in the information.
Id.
87. Id.
88. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4322 (1974). There is an unqualified privilege in
nonadjudicative proceedings.
89. Id. § 4323. "The privilege.., shall not prevent a reporter from being required in
an adjudicative proceeding to testify concerning the content, but not the source, of the





information, the efforts made by the seeking party to obtain the
information from alternative sources, and the possible effect dis-
closure will have on "the future flow of information to the
public."9'
Minnesota also requires that the party seeking production
demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that "(1) ... the
source has information clearly relevant to a specific violation of
the law ... (2) . .. the information cannot be obtained by any
alternative means ... less destructive of first amendment rights,
and (3) ... there is a compelling and overriding interest requir-
ing the disclosure . . . where the disclosure is necessary to pre-
vent injustice."9 The Minnesota statute does not distinguish the
sources from the information itself. Both are subject to a quali-
fied privilege.
The New Jersey Legislature, recognizing the need to provide
newspeople with a broad privilege against disclosure that could
be balanced against a defendant's sixth amendment rights,
amended its original shield law. Under the new law,93 the claim
for a newsperson's privilege could be overcome by a showing by
a preponderance of the evidence that:
there is a reasonable probability that the subpoenaed materials
are relevant, material and necessary to the defense, that they
could not be secured from any less intrusive source, that the value
of the material sought as it bears upon the issue of guilt or inno-
cence outweighs the privilege against disclosure, and that the re-
quest is not overbroad, oppressive, or unreasonably burdensome
which may be overcome by evidence that all or part of the infor-
mation sought is irrelevant, immaterial, unnecessary to the de-
fense, or that it can be secured from another source. 4
In addition to the elements of the Branzburg test, the statute
incorporates a balancing test of the interests served by compul-
sory process against those served by protecting the newsperson's
source and information.
91. Id.
92. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.024 (West Supp. 1988).
93. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to 2A:84A-21-13 (West Supp. 1987).




b. Partial Inclusion of the Branzburg Elements
Oklahoma employs a modification of the Branzburg test.9 5
The party seeking the identity of the source or the information
must establish by clear and convincing evidence the relevancy of
the material to a significant issue in the proceeding and his use
of "due diligence" to find alternative sources.9 6 Rhode Island
also employs a modified two-part test. 7 Its statute provides for
a lesser standard, that of "substantial evidence," which requires
the person seeking the information or its source to establish the
relevancy of the information to the prosecution of a specific fel-
ony or "to prevent a threat to human life," as well as its unavail-
ability from other witnesses.98 Arizona employs a similar test in
requiring the seeking party to provide affidavits attesting to the
relevance of the information to the action and the exhaustion of
alternative sources.9 9 Satisfaction of this test by the seeking
party may require the reporter to disclose the identity of his
source or the information obtained in the news gathering
process.
4. Statutes Granting an Absolute Privilege
A minority of states have granted an absolute privilege in
their statutes. There is no qualifying language as to confidential-
ity, nor a test as to when disclosure of either reporters' sources
or information is required. The Nevada Shield Law provides:
No reporter ... of any newspaper ... radio or television sta-
tion may be required to disclose any published or unpublished
information obtained or prepared by such person in such person's
professional capacity in gathering, receiving or processing infor-
mation for communication to the public, or the source of any in-
formation procured or obtained by such person, in any legal pro-
ceedings, trial or investigation . ... '00
The statute provides for this privilege to be accorded in such
proceedings as grand jury investigations, legislative or commit-
95. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506(B)(2) (1980).
96. Id.
97. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-3 (2)(c) (1985).
98. Id.
99. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-2214(A)(2), (4) (Supp. 1987).




tee hearings, or department, agency, or commission pro-
ceedings." 1
While the language of the Delaware statute is broad, it is
more ambiguous in its application than is the language of the
Nevada statute. Under the terms of the Delaware statute,
nonadjudicative proceedings confer an absolute privilege upon
newsmen against mandatory disclosure of information or of the
identity of sources. 102 However, the ambiguity lies in the defini-
tion of "nonadjudicative proceedings." It is not clear whether or
not Delaware characterizes the grand jury proceeding as adjudi-
cative. Only if grand juries are treated as nonadjudicative pro-
ceedings would there truly be an absolute privilege.
C. The Evolution of the New York Shield Law
1. Legislative History
In 1949, the New York Legislature investigated the possibil-
ity of enacting a law granting a privilege to newsmen,"' but it
was not until 1970 that the New York Shield Law was finally
adopted. 10' Earlier, the legislature recognized that although
there was no common-law privilege for newsmen, it could be cre-
ated statutorily. However, at that time, the legislature was not
willing to join the minority of states 105 that offered such protec-
tion to newspeople:
101. Id. The language of the statute is very specific and far-reaching:
1. Before any court, grand jury, coroner's inquest, jury or any officer thereof.
2. Before the legislature or any committee thereof.
3. Before any department, agency or commission of the state.
4. Before any local governing body or committee thereof, or any officer of a local
government.
Id.
102. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
103. The Journalist's Privilege to Withhold the Source of His News, 1949 N.Y. LAW
REv. COMm. REP. 33, 49 [hereinafter The Journalist's Privilege]. New bills were intro-
duced in 1936, 1938, 1939, 1946, 1947, and 1948, but none became law. In 1946, two bills
passed the Senate, but were defeated in the Assembly committees. Id. Interest in enact-
ing a shield law seemed to escalate each time a new case arose holding reporters in con-
tempt. Id. at 49-50.
104. Act of May 12, 1970, ch. 615, 1970 N.Y. Laws 1357-58 (codified as amended at
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1988)).
105. From 1896 until the time of the commission's report in 1949, eleven states had




The policy of the law is to require the disclosure of all informa-
tion by witnesses in order that justice may prevail. The granting
of a privilege from such disclosure constitutes an exception to the
general rule .... [T]he existence of the privilege from disclosure
• . . works a hardship. The tendency is not to extend the classes
to whom the privilege from disclosure is granted, but to restrict
that privilege.1"'
The sponsor of the 1970 "Freedom of Information Bill for
Newsmen" stated that the purpose of the bill was to protect the
news media from being forced by investigative bodies to reveal
"the sources of their information on material which they have
broadcast or published.' ' 0 7 The impetus behind the bill was the
attempts by the Justice Department to serve large newspapers
and television networks with subpoenas and the recognition that
the news media needed legislative protection. 108
In approving the Shield Law, Governor Nelson A. Rockefel-
ler asserted that New York, "as the Nation's principal center of
news gathering and dissemination,"' 0 9 would now have a strong
statute protecting both the newsman's first amendment rights
and the public's right to a free flow of news."10 The broad-reach-
ing protection afforded by the law prevented a newsman from
being charged with contempt for the failure or refusal to disclose
106. Id. at 49 (quoting People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 295, 199 N.E.
415, 416 (1936)). For a discussion of Mooney, see supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
107. Memorandum of Assemblyman Betros, reprinted in 1970 N.Y. LEGIs. ANN. 33.
108. Id.
The recent practices of the Justice Department have brought to everyone's atten-
tion the fact that the news media could be subjected to unwarranted "fishing"
expeditions wherein investigators for these bodies could hope to learn from re-
porters, their notes, their research and conversations, facts and other material
which could be later used in criminal prosecutions. The professional newspaper-
man frequently possesses [a] mass of notes and information which he has derived
from various sources, some reliable and some not reliable from which he has
gleaned his news stories. Frequently, a reporter has information in his files or a
news service possesses information which because of its dubious nature is not used
for actual publication. Without any protective legislation these sources of informa-
tion could be investigated by agencies under the threat of citing the newspaper-
man for contempt for failure to disclose his files.
Id.
109. Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 615, N.Y. Laws (May 12, 1970),





his sources or information gathered.'11 The Governor noted that
the result of not protecting the newsman from contempt charges
for failing to disclose under subpoena would be a significant re-
duction in the newsman's "ability to gather vital in-
formation.""' 2
As noted below, the New York Legislature later amended
the Shield Law on two separate occasions, in response to narrow
statutory interpretations by the judiciary."' The judiciary disre-
garded the purpose and reasoning underlying the legislature's
enactment of the act by consistently holding that nonconfiden-
tial information and personal observation were not privileged," 4
or that the privilege was waived by the publication of the story
or of the source's identity."' The legislature responded in 1975
by strengthening the statute with a provision which gave the
news media immunity from being held in contempt for refusing
to disclose sources of information to a grand jury."' This provi-
sion was necessary because at that time, legal authorities
thought that the New York Shield Law provided inadequate
protection for news media personnel in grand jury
investigations."17
111. Id.
The bill protects journalists and newscasters from charges of contempt in any pro-
ceeding brought under State law for refusing or failing to disclose information or
sources of information obtained in the course of gathering news for publication.
The types of information that need not be disclosed by newsmen are written,
oral and pictorial information and communications concerning local, national or
world-wide events or any other matter of public concern or public interest or af-
fecting the public welfare.
Id.
112. Id. Governor Rockefeller relied on statements of prominent reporters to the
effect that their ability to gather news would be diminished, fifteen other states that had
enacted statutes granting a testimonial privilege to newsmen, and case law. Id. However,
his reliance on Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), was ill-founded
since that case was later reversed in Branzburg.
113. See infra notes 116-126 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 127-148 and accompanying text.
115. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
116. Act of June 24, 1975, ch. 316, § 1, 1975 N.Y. Laws 435 (codified as amended at
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b) (McKinney 1976)) which states in pertinent part: "[N]or
shall a grand jury seek to have a journalist or newscaster held in contempt by a court,
legislature or other body having contempt powers." Id.
117. Memorandum of Assemblyman Kremer, reprinted in 1975 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 38,
39. "The so-called 'shield law' adopted in 1970 gave news media personnel immunity
from contempt when appearing before a court the legislature or any other body possess-
1988]
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In 1981, in light of the judiciary's persistent disregard of the
legislature's intent, the legislature again amended the statute to
"correct loopholes and fill gaps in the existing statute ....
This amendment was considered necessary after the New Jersey
Supreme Court decision in In re Farber,"9 affirming the con-
tempt conviction of a reporter. The amendment strengthened
the statute by including "all persons professionally engaged in a
journalistic capacity,"1 20 thereby broadening the scope of the
statute's protection, 2' and excluding evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the statute as incompetent. 122 The amendment also pro-
hibited the imposition of fines or imprisonment against a news-
man who properly invoked the privilege. 2  The legislature
ing contempt powers. Grand juries who do not possess contempt powers have success-
fully sought in many states to have media employees held in contempt." Id. at 39.
118. Memorandum of Assemblyman Sanders, reprinted in 1981 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN.
257 [hereinafter cited as Sanders Memorandum]. "The bill guarantees absolute coverage
for persons professionally engaged in a news gathering capacity, and grants the journalist
sole determination as to when that protection may be waived. The original intent of the
Legislature in 1970 is to be reinforced, and strengthened." Id.
119. 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978). Myron Farber, a
New York Times reporter, compiled notes and material while investigating a murder
defendant's case. The defendant sought to obtain these notes. New Jersey's highest court
held that the Shield Law must yield to the defendant's sixth amendment right to con-
front adverse witnesses. Id. at 274, 394 A.2d at 337. During these proceedings, Farber
spent a total of forty days in jail and the New York Times paid $286,000 in contempt
penalties. N.Y.L.J., June 5, 1980, at 1, col. 2.
120. Sanders Memorandum, supra note 118 at 257.
121. Act of May 12, 1970, ch. 615, 1970 N.Y. Laws 1357-58. The term "professional
journalist" was expanded as a result of amendments in 1981 to include
one who, for gain or livelihood, is engaged in gathering, preparing, collecting, writ-
ing, editing, filming, taping or photographing of news intended for a newspaper,
magazine, news agency, press association or wire service or other professional me-
dium or agency which has as one of its regular functions the processing and re-
searching of news intended for dissemination to the public; such persons shall be
someone performing said function either as a regular employee or as one otherwise
professionally affiliated for gain or livelihood with such medium of com-
munication.
Act of July 7, 1981, ch. 468, § 1, 1981 N.Y. Laws 944 (codified as amended at N.Y. Civ.
RIGHTs LAW § 79-h(a)(6) (McKinney Supp. 1988)).
122. Act of July 7, 1981, ch. 468, § 3, 1981 N.Y. Laws 945 (codified as amended at
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(c) (McKinney Supp. 1988)): "Any information obtained in
violation of the provisions of this section shall be inadmissable in any action or proceed-
ing or hearing before any agency."
123. Act of July 7, 1981, ch. 468, § 3, 1981 N.Y. Laws 945 (codified as amended at
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(d) (McKinney Supp. 1988)): "No fine or imprisonment may
be imposed against a person for any refusal to disclose information privileged by the
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further strengthened the contempt provision by declaring that
the privilege encompassed materials that were highly relevant to
a governmental investigation, even if the newsman had not solic-
ited the disclosure.1
24
Thus, the 1981 amendment expanded the scope of protec-
tion to include a broad spectrum of news media personnel and
strengthened the protection against contempt charges by includ-
ing relevant material in the privilege. The legislature intention-
ally did not qualify its protection with elements of the
Branzburg test, as did the New Jersey Legislature in response to
the Farber decision.12 5 Assemblyman Steven Sanders, the spon-
sor of the 1981 amendment, used the most absolute language in
framing the amendment, instead of following the "laundry list"
approach which could inadvertently omit a specific item from
the protection of the statute. Therefore, in drafting the amend-
ment, he specifically did not include a provision that would
speak strictly to nonconfidential information.12 1
2. Judicial Interpretation
a. Prior to the 1981 Amendment
After the 1970 enactment, the judiciary found a variety of
reasons to pierce the New York Shield Law. In Wolf v. Peo-
ple, 1 27 two limitations were placed on the broad langauge of the
provisions of this section."
124. Act of July 7, 1981, ch. 468, § 2, 1981 N.Y. Laws 945 (codified as amended at
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988)).
Exemption of professional journalists and newscasters from contempt ...
[N]otwithstanding that the material or identity of a source of such material or
related material gathered by a person described above performing a function de-
scribed above is or is not highly relevant to a particular inquiry of government and
notwithstanding that the information was not solicited by the journalist or news-
caster prior to disclosure to him.
Id.
125. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
126. Telephone interview with Stephen Kaufman, Special Assistant to Assembly-
man Sanders (Feb. 6, 1988).
127. 69 Misc. 2d 256, 329 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 39 A.D.2d 864,
333 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1st Dep't 1972). In Wolf, a newspaper published an article regarding a
prison riot, allegedly written by a prisoner who was indicted for kidnapping, coercion,
and other crimes committed during the riot. The newspaper was served with a subpoena
duces tecum to produce the original manuscript of the article for use by the district
attorney in the prosecution of the prisoner. The article did not purport to be anonymous,
1988]
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statute. Initially, the trial court read a requirement of confiden-
tiality into the Shield Law.1"8 It found that to raise a successful
claim of privilege, one had to show that the information or its
source was obtained in the process of gathering news for publi-
cation and that there was either an express or implied under-
standing that there would be no disclosure of the source or in-
formation.129 Thus, Wolf firmly established the "cloak of
confidentiality" as a prerequisite to invoking the protection of
the Shield Law.13 0
The Wolf decision further limited the Shield Law by hold-
ing that "[plublication of the article constituted a voluntary dis-
closure." ' 1  Accordingly, publication waived the privilege,
whether all or part of the information or the identity of the
source was revealed.1 32
and the published article was found not to be confidential within the meaning of section
79-h of the N.Y. Civil Rights Law. The newspaper's motion to quash was denied. Id. at
261-62, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 297.
128. Id. at 261, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 296. The trial court cited the broad langliage of the
statute and indicated that one statement qualified another. "[Tihe phrase 'for refusing
or failing to disclose any news or the source of such news coming into his possession' is
qualified by the phrase 'in the course of gathering or obtaining news for publication'
etc." Id. As to the information upon which news stories were based, the court then con-
cluded it was only "the private information or the undisclosed source which is to be
protected. Implicit in the section is the element of confidentiality." Id. However, we are
not enlightened as to where exactly this requirement of confidentiality arises.
129. Id.
130. But cf. People v. Marahan, 81 Misc. 2d 637, 368 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1975). The court held that a reporter could not be questioned concerning the
source of his information and could refuse to testify on the basis of section 79-h of the
N.Y. Civil Rights Law. In Davis v. Davis, 88 Misc. 2d 1, 386 N.Y.S.2d 992 (Family Ct.
Rensselaer County 1976), a subpoena was quashed where the actual source of letters
published in a newspaper column was not revealed or made public by the letter writer,
on the grounds that the information was entitled to be deemed to be under a cloak of
confidentiality. These were the only two cases prior to the 1981 amendments that did not
require a cloak of confidentiality.
131. 69 Misc. 2d at 261, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 297. "The representations by the Village
Voice that the article in question was authored by Ricardo de Leon constitute a waiver
of any possible protection afforded by the statute." Id.
132. The appellate court affirmed, finding neither a first amendment protection nor
a protection under section 79-h of the N. Y. Civil Rights Law. "[Tihe information sought
by the subpoena has been published and the source revealed. The statute therefore, can-
not be used as a shield to protect that which has already been exposed to view." Wolf, 39
A.D.2d at 864, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 301.
See also People v. Zagarino, 97 Misc. 2d 181, 411 N.Y.S.2d, 494 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1978) (news reporter's notes and memoranda not protected where she obtained
information about the defendant from an undercover police officer whose identity would
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss2/6
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In WBAI-FM v. Proskin,33 the court again limited the
scope of the Shield Law's protection, and strengthened the con-
fidentiality requirement, by holding that nonconfidential infor-
mation did not enjoy any privilege under the Shield Law.
WBAI-FM involved a radio announcer who read the contents of
a letter containing a bomb threat on the air.134 The announcer
had been given the location of the letter by an anonymous
caller.13 5 The announcer later released the contents of the letter
to all interested news agencies. 3 6 The radio station was served
with a subpoena duces tecum requesting the production of the
letter for a grand jury investigation."3 7 WBAI-FM instituted a
proceeding to quash the subpoena, claiming privilege under the
New York Shield Law. 38 The trial court found that the letter
was outside the scope of the privilege since it was not a confi-
dential communication. 139 The trial court further held that the
failure to comply with the subpoena would result in contempt
proceedings.' 40 The appellate division affirmed the lower court
finding that the author had exhibited his unwillingness to estab-
lish a confidential relationship because his identity remained
anonymous, and he had left the letter in a public place.' The
be revealed and dissolve any confidential relationship that existed); Andrews v. Andreoli,
92 Misc. 2d 410, 400 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1977) (confidentiality
waived where newsman's sources spoke to prosecution staff members or spoke to news-
man in public places without explicitly or implicitly establishing a confidential relation-
ship); People v. Dupree, 88 Misc. 2d 791, 388 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976)
(publication of certain photographs taken at the scene of a homicide waived the protec-
tion of the statute thereby requiring the disclosure of all such photographs taken).
133. 42 A.D.2d 5, 344 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dep't 1973).
134. In re WBAI-FM, 68 Misc. 2d 355, 326 N.Y.S.2d 434 (Albany County Ct. 1971).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 357, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 436.
138. Id. at 356, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
139. Id. at 357, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 436-37. The court held that the letter was not ac-
quired through the efforts of the "news media to obtain information" and limited the
nature of the protection of section 79-h of the N.Y. Civil Rights Law given to the press
as being "subservient to the furtherance of public policy requiring investigation of crime
and prosecution therefor, at least where the information received is not the result of
affirmative questioning of persons by a news media agency acting as such." Id.
140. Id. at 358, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 437.
141. WBAI-FM, 42 A.D.2d at 7, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 394-95. In his dissent, Judge Cooke
argued that the letter was obtained through a confidential relationship that was im-
pliedly established because: (1) the newsman had never revealed the identity of the
caller; (2) the letter had no identifiable signature; and (3) the nature of the communica-
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appellate court found that without the cloak of confidentiality
there could be no protection under the statute.142
In addition to the judicial limitations placed on the statute
for confidentiality and publication, personal observation was
also found not to be protected under the law by the court in
People v. Dan.14  In Dan, two journalists were subpoenaed to
testify as to criminal activity they had witnessed while inside
Attica prison during the prisoner riot. The journalists refused to
comply since they were at Attica in their "capacity as news-
gatherer[s] and not as an arm of the government.""' The court
held that the Shield Law did not exempt newsmen from their
duty to testify before a grand jury as to their personal observa-
tions of events or identities of persons.' 5 However, the court did
hold that the newsmen need not divulge the identity of an in-
formant from whom they had obtained their information.146
Subsequently, one of the journalists moved to quash a subpoena,
issued as a result of his grand jury testimony, requiring him to
testify at trial.4 7 The court denied the motion on the grounds
that the information "(1) is material to the prosecution of this
case; and (2) was not obtained as a result of a confidential
source; and (3) was published .... ",41
tion of the letter demonstrated a request for confidentiality. These elements established
an understanding of confidentiality which permits the communication to be shielded. Id.
at 9-10, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 397 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
142. WBAI-FM, 42 A.D.2d at 6, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 394. The court cited Governor
Rockefeller's intent in approving the Shield Law to protect information that reporters
have acquired in confidence. Historically, privileges were usually found only where confi-
dential relationships existed and are an exception to the general rule of the duty of all
citizens to testify to an authorized governmental body; therefore, they should be strictly
construed. Id. at 7, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
143. 41 A.D.2d 687, 342 N.Y.S.2d 731 (4th Dep't), appeal dismissed, 32 N.Y.2d 764,
298 N.E.2d 118, 344 N.Y.S.2d 955, appeal denied, 32 N.Y.2d 613, 300 N.E.2d 745, 347
N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1973).
144. Dan v. Simonetti, 80 Misc. 2d 399, 400, 363 N.Y.S.2d 493, 495 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1975) (a subsequent proceeding discussing the facts of People v. Dan).
145. Dan, 41 A.D.2d at 688, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 733.
146. Id.
147. Dan, 80 Misc. 2d at 400, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
148. Id. at 403, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 498. The court found that no confidential relation-
ship had been established since the person giving the information had not requested that
his identity remain anonymous. Had a confidential relationship been established, the
privilege would have been waived by publication when the reporter gave a statement to
the district attorney, the grand jury, and for a report published by Bantam Books, Inc.
These statements were also made at a negotiating table in the prison and therefore could
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In People v. Le Grand,149 yet another restriction was placed
upon the scope of the Shield Law. An author of a book about an
alleged member of a crime family sought to invoke the statute's
protection to quash a subpoena requiring the production of
notes and tapes of interviews with a family "intimate. '" 150 The
court held that the legislative design of the statute protected
only "professional journalists" and "newscasters,"' 51  not
authors.
b. Post-1981 Decisions Requiring Confidentiality
The legislature responded in 1981 by amending the statute
again, 52 and the judiciary now focused on the issue of whether
the new amendment had resolved the cloak of confidentiality
controversy. Many trial courts continued to hold that confidenti-
ality was a requirement of the statute. 5 3 In Hennigan v. Buffalo
Courier Express Co.,' 5 a police officer who had been erroneously
identified in a series of articles as a participant in the brutal
beating of a city employee brought suit for defamation against
the newspaper and certain of its employees.15 5 The plaintiff sub-
mitted a series of interrogatories, and defendants answered sev-
eral, while moving to strike others. 56 The appellate division af-
firmed the lower court's holding that those interrogatories were
properly stricken when a confidential relationship existed, but
held that the lower court had erred in striking an interrogatory
pertaining to nonconfidential information.'57
In People v. Bova, 5 8 the court found that although the 1981
amendment included unsolicited information within the stat-
be heard by bystanders. Id. at 401-03, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 496-98.
149. 67 A.D.2d 446, 415 N.Y.S.2d 252 (2d Dep't 1979).
150. Id. at 449, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 254.
151. Id. at 451, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 255. Statutes "should not by judicial fiat and
strained interpretation be deemed to encompass those engaged in a different field of
writing and research." Id.
152. See supra notes 121-124 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 154-166 and accompanying text.
154. 85 A.D.2d 924, 446 N.Y.S.2d 767 (4th Dep't 1981).
155. Id. at 924, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 924-25, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 768. At no point did the appellate court acknowl-
edge or analyze the effect of the 1981 amendments on the statute.
158. 118 Misc. 2d 14, 460 N.Y.S.2d 230 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1983).
19881
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ute's protection, the amendment did not eliminate the cloak
of confidentiality requirement. 1 9 Accordingly, in People v.
Korkala,60 CBS moved to quash a subpoena duces tecum for
the production of a reporter's video and audio tapes, and unpub-
lished outtakes, of interviews with a defendant in a pending
criminal prosecution. CBS claimed that an absolute privilege
was afforded by the 1981 amendment to the Shield Law.""1 The
court again found that confidentiality was still a criterion for the
statute's protection because "the very provision contained in the
initial version of the bill that would have eliminated the 'cloak
of confidentiality' requirement for invoking the Shield Law was
deleted from the version finally passed."""2 Therefore, the sub-
poena was upheld because the information was not imparted
through a confidential relationship.16
The issue appeared again, in In re Pennzoil Co.,164 where a
nonparty witness, a magazine reporter, tried to quash a sub-
poena seeking his deposition regarding an article he had pub-
lished. '65 The court again found that the privilege against
159. In Bova, notes pertaining to an interview with a witness to a murder were sub-
poenaed by the defendant. The New York Times Company and the reporter moved to
quash the subpoena asserting a protection from disclosure under New York's Shield Law
(N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h, as amended); and on a first amendment claim of a re-
porter's privilege against disclosure. The court held that the Shield Law did "not provide
a basis for quashing the subpoenas .... Petitioners ... failed to adequately assert that
...the interview was conducted under the requisite 'cloak of confidentiality.'" Id. at
19, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 233. However, the court did quash the subpoena under the first
amendment. Id. at 22, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
160. 99 A.D.2d 161, 472 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1st Dep't 1984).
161. Id. at 162, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
162. Id. at 165-66, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 313. The court acknowledged that the deletion
itself did not conclusively establish the legislative intent, but was a significant indicia
when "divining legislative intent." Id. at 166, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 313. The court also relied
on the continued judicial policy of interpreting the statute as requiring an implicit or
explicit understanding of a confidential relationship. Id.
163. Id. at 165, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 313. The court held that no confidential relationship
existed because there was a clear expectation that both the material and source would be
broadcast on "60 Minutes" and that "[u]nder the settled pre-1981 interpretation of sec-
tion 79-h, no privilege shields the unbroadcast material, these 'outtakes', from produc-
tion." Id. On the basis of the deletion of the provisions that would eliminate the confi-
dentiality requirement that the judiciary had previously read into the statute, the court
determined that the requirement still existed. Id. at 165-66, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
164. 108 A.D.2d 666, 485 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1st Dep't 1985).
165. This case is focused around a controversy in which Pennzoil alleged that Tex-
aco, Inc., had induced Getty Oil Company to breach an agreement pursuant to which
Pennzoil Inc., would control three-sevenths of Getty. The nonparty witness, Peter Nulty,
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mandatory disclosure could only be raised where there is a cloak
of confidentiality. Even with the existence of a confidential rela-
tionship, however, the privilege would be waived by pub-
lication. 6
c. Post-1981 Decisions Not Requiring Confidentiality
Other trial courts have held that the cloak of confidentiality
requirement had been negated by the 1981 amendments. In Peo-
ple v. Iannaccone,167 an investigative reporter moved to quash a
subpoena for the production of the tape, or transcript of the
tape, obtained while preparing an article, as yet unpublished,
about a murder case. The court considered this to be a case of
first impression to determine the scope of the privilege afforded
by the nev~ly amended Shield Law."6 ' It found that "ordering
the reporter ... to produce any notes compiled by her concern-
ing interviews with any witnesses or participants... would be in
direct contravention of her statutory rights under the Shield
Law.... [T]he statute protects her from divulging not only the
identity of her source, but also against the compulsory disclosure
of any notes."' 6 " The court based its conclusion on the legisla-
a reporter for Fortune magazine, had interviewed Getty's chairman and had published a
quote from this interview in his article. Pennzoil sought to question Nulty as to the
actual words Petersen employed. Id. at 666, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 535.
166. Id. at 667, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 535. The court relied on People v. Korkala, 99
A.D.2d 161, 472 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1st Dep't 1984), in finding that a confidential relationship
had to exist. The Korkala court acknowledged that a qualified privilege exists under the
first amendment upon the satisfaction of the three-prong test of relevancy, necessity, and
availability. 99 A.D.2d at 167, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 314. However, in Pennzoil, the court
stated that this three-prong test was unnecessary since the material was already pub-
lished and therefore, the privilege was waived. 108 A.D.2d at 667, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 535.
167. 112 Misc. 2d 1057, 447 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982), See also In
re Consumers Union, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2038 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), in which a federal
district court quashed a subpoena in a products liability case demanding the production
of unpublished material regarding automobile evaluation and employee testimony. The
court found that the public policy of the state was to discourage mandated disclosure of
sources or information, whether published or unpublished. But cf. Westmoreland v. CBS,
97 F.R.D. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (in which a United States district court held that an inter-
nal memorandum prepared in the investigation of a libel action was not news gathering
as defined by the statute, and therefore beyond the scope of its protection).
168. Iannaccone, 112 Misc. 2d at 1058, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
169. Id. at 1059, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 997. The court gives the Shield Law a very broad
interpretation.
The clear language of the New York Shield Law indicates that the Legislature
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ture's response to prior decisions of the courts which demon-
strated that the judiciary was "disinclined to follow the letter or
even spirit of the existing law. '1 70 The court concluded that both
confidential and nonconfidential information were now within
the scope of the Shield Law's protection. 7 1 Subsequently, in
Lawless v. Clay, 72 the court found that the confidentiality re-
quirement had been eliminated and construed the Shield Law to
be absolute.17 3
Relying on the language in the statute that newsmen may
refuse to disclose "any news or the source of any such news'17"
obtained in the news gathering process, the New York Supreme
Court, in Wilkins v. Kalla'75 held that "the statute makes clear
that its protection extends not only to confidential sources, but
intended to prevent a defendant from conducting a "fishing expedition" into the
work product of a reporter, regardless of the relevancy of any material in the re-
porter's possession. The reporter's information and source of such information are
privileged regardless of its relevancy.
Id. at 1060, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 998.
170. Id. at 1061, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 998 (quoting Memorandum of Steven Sanders).
The court focused on the change in the legal climate. A reporter who was held in con-
tempt and fined (along with the New York Times) for failing to comply with a court
order to produce documents concerning a murder suspect (In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394
A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978)) was pardoned and portions of the fines were
remitted; concomitantly, the New Jersey Shield Law was amended. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
2A:84A-21.1 to 2A:84A-21.8 (West Supp. 1987). The court also recognized that freedom
of the press is not absolute and set criteria where the shield law protection applies
"where an investigative reporter compiled information both confidential and nonconfi-
dential, and where there has been no publication or disclosure of any of the information
compiled, and where the defense subpoena duces tecum is a broad and general request
• ..the Shield Law mandates that the subpoena duces tecum be quashed." Iannaccone,
112 Misc. 2d at 1063, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 1000.
171. "Although the Legislature, in amending section 79-h of the Civil Rights Law,
has again refrained from including explicit language with regard to confidentiality ...
the Shield Law, as amended, protects both the confidential and nonconfidential informa-
tion ...." Id. at 1062, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
172. 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1223 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
173. Id. In Lawless, the plaintiff alleged that a Syracuse newspaper printed errone-
ous information obtained from a police blotter indicating that the defendant had been
arrested for commiting a crime. The plaintiff made a motion to depose the newspaper to
show that it was a common practice of the newspaper to utilize the police blotter to
obtain information for its articles. The court denied the plaintiff's motion on the grounds
that the Shield Law was absolute, and therefore, provided protection from disclosure of
both confidential and nonconfidential sources. Id.
174. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW § 79-h(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
175. 118 Misc. 2d 34, 459 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
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also to all unpublished information.' 176 Subpoenaed outtakes,
notes, and other nonbroadcast materials compiled for the televi-
sion news program "60 Minutes" were held nondiscoverable be-
cause they fell within the purview of the New York Shield
Law. 177 The court held that the intent of the 1981 amendment
was to insure a "broad and pervasive protection" to the news
media in all phases of gathering and disseminating news. 17 8
d. Recent Decisions
Recent decisions indicate a liberal approach toward the in-
terpretation of the language of the New York Shield Law. The
New York Court of Appeals addressed the Shield Law in a civil
case, Oak Beach Inn v. Babylon Beacon,7 9 and in the context of
a criminal proceeding in Beach v. Shanley, a0 on the same day.
In Oak Beach Inn, the appellate division had held that not only
did the Shield Law protect newsmen from contempt proceedings
upon failure to disclose subpoenaed information and sources,
but that it would be unduly restrictive if those same newsmen
were then subject to large monetary judgments in civil proceed-
ings. ' The court of appeals, in affirming the appellate decision,
176. Id. at 36, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 987. The court acknowledged that any doubt as to
the absolute privilege afforded by the New York Shield Law was laid to rest by the 1981
amendment. Id.
177. Id. at 35, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 986. The plaintiff, a former cotton mill worker, al-
leged that he contracted "brown lung disease" due to the negligence and malfeasance of
his defendant employers. The defendants alleged that they were entitled to the informa-
tion compiled for a report, broadcast February 4, 1979, entitled, "Brown Lung." Id. at
34-35, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 986. "It is clear that the subpoenas in question seek to exploit
certain professional journalists as unwilling investigators and seriously interfere with and
undermine their ability to gather news." Id. at 35, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 986.
178. Id. at 37, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 987. See also CBA Elecs. v. Ellenberg, 10 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1095 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1983) (the Shield Law affords absolute protection
against the disclosure of confidential and nonconfidential information where the plaintiff
subpoenaed testimony of a reporter to disclose whether or not the defendant had made
reference to the plaintiff during an interview).
179. 92 A.D.2d 102, 459 N.Y.S.2d 819 (2d Dep't 1983), afl'd, 62 N.Y.2d 158, 464
N.E.2d 967, 476 N.Y.S.2d 269 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158 (1985).
180. 62 N.Y.2d 241, 465 N.E.2d 304, 476 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1984).
181. 92 A.D.2d at 104, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 820. It should be noted that while the court
of appeals affirmed the lower court decision, Judge Wachtler expressly stated that he
affirmed the decision on different grounds: "The consequences of nondisclosure imposed
pursuant to the CPLR should not create new obstacles to newsgathering or undermine




held that holding defendant newspaper in contempt for failing
to identify a letter writer so that suit could commence was pro-
hibited by the Shield Law.'82
In Beach v. Shanley,183 a reporter for a television station in
Schenectady had expressly agreed to protect the identity of an
informant who had given the reporter information regarding the
contents of sealed grand jury reports.84 The reporter was served
with a subpoena duces tecum to appear before a grand jury in-
vestigating the sources of the leaked information. The reporter
moved to quash, claiming the protection of New York's Shield
Law."8 " The county court granted the motion to quash,186 but
the appellate division reversed on the grounds that it impaired
the grand jury's power to investigate public officers."8 7 The court
of appeals reversed, granting the motion to quash.' In an opin-
ion by Chief Judge Cooke, the Shield Law was given its most
expansive construction. The majority held that reporters who re-
fuse to divulge their news sources are protected, notwithstanding
that the information concerns criminal activity or that the reve-
lation to the reporter itself might be a criminal act.'89 The high-
166, 464 N.E.2d at 971, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
182. Oak Beach Inn, 62 N.Y.2d at 168, 464 N.E.2d at 972, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 274. A
restaurant owner brought a libel action against a local newspaper for publishing an anon-
ymous letter. The newspaper refused to disclose the identity of the letter writer at the
plaintiff's demand, claiming privilege under the Shield Law. Id. at 162-63, 464 N.E.2d at
968, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
183. 62 N.Y.2d 241, 465 N.E.2d 304, 476 N.Y.S.2d 765.
184. The reports were compiled in connection with allegations against a lieutenant
and captain involved in retaining or selling guns. Two of the reports were sealed and
recommended the removal of two public officials. The station broadcast that the sheriff
was one of the officials to be removed. Id. at 246, 465 N.E.2d at 306, 476 N.Y.S.2d at
767.
185. Id. at 247, 465 N.E.2d at 306-07, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 767-68.
186. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 118 Misc. 2d 195, 460 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Rensselaer
County Ct. 1983), rev'd sub nom., Beach v. Shanley, 94 A.D.2d 542, 466 N.Y.S.2d 725 (3d
Dep't 1983), rev'd, 62 N.Y.2d 241, 465 N.E.2d 304, 476 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1984).
187. Beach, 94 A.D.2d 542, 466 N.Y.S.2d 725 (3d Dep't 1983), rev'd, 62 N.Y.2d 241,
465 N.E.2d 304, 476 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1984).
188. Beach, 62 N.Y.2d at 254, 465 N.E.2d at 311, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 772.
189. Id. at 251, 465 N.E.2d at 310, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 771. "[A] subpoena requiring a
television reporter to appear before a grand jury investigating the unauthorized disclo-
sure of another grand jury's report should be quashed." Id. at 246, 465 N.E.2d at 306,
476 N.Y.S.2d at 767. However, the court noted that while the Shield Law creates an
evidentiary privilege and a protection against contempt orders, it does not authorize the




est court also concluded that reporters enjoy a broad privilege
under the New York Shield Law due to the lack of "any qualify-
ing language."19 0 Beach had the effect of making New York's
Shield Law one of the strongest in the nation.191 However, the
Beach court failed to address the "cloak of confidentiality" or
"waiver by publication" exceptions formerly read into the Shield
Law by the judiciary, thereby leaving the door open to retreat
from its more expansive approach to the question of newsmen's
privilege.
III. Knight-Ridder Broadcasting v. Greenberg
A. The Facts
In February 1966, portions of an interview with Mr. Donald
Bent were televised in an evening broadcast by WTEN-TV, the
Knight-Ridder television station in Albany, New York. 92 At
that time, Mr. Bent's wife had been missing for several days.
The interview was conducted by a reporter with the support of a
back-up news team. Approximately one minute of the interview
was broadcast, and the remaining portions were never made
public."'
After Mrs. Bent was found dead in the trunk of an automo-
bile, Donald Bent became a suspect in the district attorney's
grand jury investigation into the death of Bent's wife."9 4 A sub-
poena duces tecum was served on WTEN demanding "all video-
tapes regarding" the station's interview with Donald Bent.'9 5 In
response to the subpoena, WTEN produced the videotape of the
newscast, a written introduction to the broadcast that had been
Each case is fact sensitive. For an in-depth discussion of Beach, see Note, Beach v.
Shanley: An Expansive Interpretation of New York's "Shield Law," 49 ALB. L. REv. 748
(1985).
190. Beach, 2 N.Y.2d at 251, 465 N.E.2d at 310, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 771.
191. See Nat'l L.J., May 28, 1984, at 6, col. 1 ("[Ihe New York law, considered one
of the broadest, became even stronger with the [holding in Beach]"). See also Note,
supra note 189, at 778 n.192 (quoting Floyd Abrams, a first amendment expert): "[T]he
Beach court interpreted the shield law in the 'broadest and most-protective fashion.'
N.Y.L.J., May 11, 1984, at 4, col. 1."
192. Knight-Ridder Broadcasting Co. v. Greenberg, 70 N.Y.2d 151, 511 N.E.2d 1116,
518 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1987).
193. Id. at 153-54, 511 N.E.2d at 1117, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
194. Id.




read on the air from the studio, as well as other information per-
tinent to the broadcast.196 WTEN refused, however, to produce
either the nonbroadcast portions of the interview or the re-
porter's notes obtained in preparation for the report. While no
preconditions had been established for the interview, WTEN al-
leged that a promise of confidentiality covered portions of the
interview. 9 7 Knight-Ridder moved to quash the subpoena duces
tecum, asserting that the New York Shield Law 98 and the first
amendment protected this material from disclosure. 9"
B. Lower Court Decisions
The supreme court for Albany County granted the motion
to quash solely on statutory grounds that this material was pro-
tected.2 00 The appellate division reversed on the grounds that
the Shield Law only provides a privilege for information ob-
tained under a cloak of confidentiality.20' Noting the first de-
partment's decision in People v. Korkala,0 2 which took the posi-
tion that the 1981 amendment to the Shield Law did not
eliminate the confidentiality requirement, the third department
found "absolutely no language in the 1981 amendment that per-
suades us otherwise . ". .. "10- The court found significant the leg-
islature's deletion of the provision in the final version of the bill
that would have "unquestionably abolished such require-
ment, 20 4 and the lack of any "clear manifestation" in the legis-
lative history of the 1981 amendment to eliminate the confiden-
tiality requirement.2 8 The appellate division also found no
merit to the first amendment claim since the qualified first
196. Id.
197. Knight-Ridder Broadcasting Co. v. Greenberg, 119 A.D.2d 68, 69, 505 N.Y.S.2d
368, 369 (3d Dep't 1986). It is also pertinent to note that at the time of this decision, it
was still not ascertained if any portion of the interview was conducted under a cloak of
confidentiality. Knight-Ridder, 70 N.Y.2d at 154, 511 N.E.2d at 1117, 518 N.Y.S.2d at
596.
198. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1988).
199. Knight-Ridder, 70 N.Y.2d at 154, 511 N.E.2d at 1117, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
200. Knight-Ridder, 119 A.D.2d at 70, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
201. Id. at 72, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
202. Id. at 71, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 71, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 370-71.




amendment privilege did not extend to taped material which
was relevant and necessary to the grand jury investigation, and
was unavailable from other sources. 00 The order was reversed,
and the matter was remitted to the supreme court for an in
camera determination of which portions of the outtakes were
confidential. 0 7
The court of appeals subsequently dismissed an appeal
taken as of right.20 The appellate division then granted leave to
appeal to the highest court on a certified question.20 9 After the
third department's decision, but before the appeal was taken,
Donald Bent was indicted, thereby mooting this question. Nev-
ertheless, the case was preserved as an exception to the moot-
ness doctrine.21 0
C. Opinion of the New York Court of Appeals
1. The Majority
Judge Alexander, writing for the majority, concluded that
the cloak of confidentiality requirement still exists. He based
this conclusion on the "unanimous appellate authority in this
State ' 211 and "unsuccessful attempts in the Legislature to
amend a statute following our interpretation of the statute as
evidence that our interpretation correctly reflected the intent of
the Legislature." '212 The majority specifically stated that the leg-
islature's rejection of an explicit provision regarding nonconfi-
dential sources inexorably indicated that the legislature did not
intend to create an absolute privilege under the Shield Law.21
206. Id. at 72, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
207. Id.
208. Knight-Ridder Broadcasting Co. v. Greenberg, 68 N.Y.2d 997, 503 N.E.2d 125,
510 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1986).
209. Knight-Ridder Broadcasting Co. v. Greenberg, 126 A.D.2d 834, 510 N.Y.S.2d
491 (3d Dep't 1987). The certified question to be reviewed by the court of appeals was
"[did this court err in reversing the Supreme Court's order and remitting the matter to
the Supreme Court for an in-camera inspection of the taped interview with Donald Bent
to determine what portions, if any, of such interview, were conducted confidentially?" Id.
at 835, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
210. Knight-Ridder, 70 N.Y.2d at 154 n.2, 511 N.E.2d at 1117 n.2, 518 N.Y.S.2d at
596 n.2.
211. Id. at 156, 511 N.E.2d at 1118, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
212. Id. at 157, 511 N.E.2d at 1119, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 598.




The court also cited the opinion of the attorney general that
the scope of the statute "did not protect journalists when the
requested information was not confidential."2"" While the court
acknowledged that the attorney general's opinion was neither
binding on the court nor dispositive of the legislative intent, it
could not be dismissed lightly, "for nothing else in the Gover-
nor's Bill Jacket concerning the 1981 amendments discusses the
confidentiality requirement. '"21 5 The majority concluded that be-
cause the legislature failed to adopt an amendment specifically
addressed to confidentiality concerns, as the sponsor had recom-
mended, the "long-standing interpretation of the Shield Law
should not be judicially abrogated. 21 6
The majority also dismissed the first amendment claim of
privilege on the grounds that the qualified privilege does not
protect the taped interview since it contained information rele-
vant and necessary to the grand jury, and it was unavailable
from other sources.2 7
2. The Dissent
In a particularly strong dissent, Judge Bellacosa, joined by
Chief Judge Wachtler and Judge Kaye, found the majority to
"functionally enact their own amendment to the core provision
of the Shield Law" under the disguise of "interpretation," "judi-
cial construction," and "legislative intent. 21  The dissent stated
that the majority had substituted the word "some" for "any,"
thereby affording protection to "some news" rather than "any
news" as was enacted into law by the legislature and approved
by the governor.119 Judge Bellacosa found it to be particularly
ironic that while the judiciary asserted that it should not substi-
tute its own intent for that of the legislature, that was exactly
214. Id. at 158, 511 N.E.2d at 1120, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 598 (citing Memorandum of
Attorney General, July 8, 1981, Governor's Bill Jacket L. 1981, ch. 468).
215. Id. at 158-59, 511 N.E.2d at 1120, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
216. Id. at 159, 511 N.E.2d at 1120, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 599. The majority distinguished
its recent decisions in Beach and Oak Beach Inn as not being inconsistent with the
confidentiality requirement because this was not an issue in either case. Id. at 160 n.6,
511 N.E.2d at 1121 n.6, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 600 n.6.
217. Id. at 160, 511 N.E.2d at 1121, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 600.
218. Id. at 161, 511 N.E.2d at 1121, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 600 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).




what the majority accomplished by imposing a confidentiality
requirement where none clearly exists.220 The judiciary "chills
[the privilege] by inserting its own confidentiality clause into an
unqualified statute.1
221
The dissent also asserted that the majority violated a
threshold rule of statutory construction by ignoring the plain
language of the statute in proceeding directly to a discussion of
the legislative history.222 In addition, the dissent faulted the ma-
jority for giving such "significant impact" to the attorney gen-
eral's 1981 opinion which was written after the bill became law
by "an official who ha[d] absolutely nothing to do with the en-
actment process or the interpretative process.
223
The dissent also accused the majority of bootstrapping be-
cause of its reference to a "'well-settled rule of confidential-
ity.' "224 The dissent pointed out that this issue had been the
focal point of hot debate in the legislature and vigorous litiga-
tion in the courts by the media for the past seventeen years, as
well as the reason for the sharp division in the court's 4-3
vote.2 25 From the dissent's point of view, the majority also over-
looked the fact that the court of appeals had never addressed
this issue of confidentiality before the 1981 amendment, and this
could have been a factor in the legislature's failure to address
the "judicial artifact of confidentiality. 226
The dissent then turned to the majority's treatment of the
most recent court of appeals decisions, which had exhibited a
more expansive approach to interpreting the Shield Law, in both
criminal and civil contexts. In Beach v. Shanley, 27 the majority
relied on the unqualified language of the statute and the spirit
behind its enactment to quash a subpoena - despite the fact
that a grand jury investigation could be thwarted, or a criminal
act could have been committed by divulging the information.228
220. Id. at 166, 511 N.E.2d at 1125, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
221. Id. at 161, 511 N.E.2d at 1122, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
222. Id. at 167, 511 N.E.2d at 1125, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 167, 511 N.E.2d at 1125, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 604-05.
225. Id. at 167, 511 N.E.2d at 1125-26, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 605.
226. Id. at 167, 511 N.E.2d at 1126, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 605.
227. 62 N.Y.2d 241, 465 N.E.2d 304, 476 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1984).
228. See supra notes 180-191 and accompanying text.
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Contemporaneously, in Oak Beach Inn v. Babylon Beacon,2 9 an
unqualified privilege was recognized for journalists in a civil pro-
ceeding.2"' The dissent was astonished by the majority's appar-
ently cavalier treatment of its own words and of stare decisis in
asserting that these cases "are of no consequence,"2 31 since confi-
dentiality was not an issue. The majority then "relegated [these
cases] to a denigrating endpiece footnote in the majority
opinion. '231 2
Accordingly, Judge Bellacosa implied that the judiciary is
making newspersons into investigative arms of the government.
The statutory language, the legislative intent exhibited in its
history, and recent precedents all buttress the argument that the
subpoena should have been quashed under the absolute protec-
tion of the New York Shield Law. 3
IV. Analysis
The broad language of the New York Shield Law2"4 enables
the judiciary, through its interpretative process, to have a crea-
229. 62 N.Y.2d 158, 464 N.E.2d 967, 476 N.Y.S.2d 269 (1984).
230. See supra notes 179-182 and accompanying text.
231. Knight-Ridder, 70 N.Y.2d at 167, 511 N.E.2d at 1126, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 605
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
232. Id. See also supra note 216. The majority explained this away by stating "what
was said is not evidence of what was decided, unless it relates directly to the question
presented for decision." Id. at 160 n.6, 511 N.E.2d at 1121 n.6, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 600 n.6
(quoting People ex rel Metro. St. Ry. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 174 N.Y. 417, 447, 67
N.E. 69, 77 (1903)).
233. Id. at 161, 168, 511 N.E.2d at 1122, 1126, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 601, 605 (Bellacosa,
J., dissenting).
234. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b), (c), (d) (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1988):
(b) Exemption of professional journalists and newscasters from contempt. Not-
withstanding the provisions of any general or specific law to the contrary, no pro-
fessional journalist or newscaster presently or having previously been employed or
otherwise associated with any newspaper, magazine, news agency, press associa-
tion, wire service, radio or television transmission station or network or other pro-
fessional medium of communicating news or information to the public shall be
adjudged in contempt by any court, the legislature or other body having contempt
powers, nor shall a grand jury seek to have a journalist or newscaster held in con-
tempt by any court, legislature or other body having contempt powers for refusing
or failing to disclose any news or the source of any such news coming into his
possession in the course of gathering or obtaining news for publication or to be
published in a newspaper, magazine, or for broadcast by a radio or television
transmission station or network or for public dissemination by any other profes-
sional medium or agency which has as one of its main functions the dissemination
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss2/6
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tive role in establishing the policy related to the law. Yet, the
role of the judiciary is to apply the "plain meaning" of the stat-
ute, not to modify the statute under the pretense of interpreta-
tion.2 31 Judicial analysis ought to begin with the "four corners"
of the statute - if there is no ambiguity in the text, it should
be enforced as written.38
A. Language of the Statute
There is no ambiguity on the face of the New York statute,
nor are there qualifications written into its terms.3 7 The abso-
lute privilege afforded by the language of the statute is not mod-
ified by requiring the seeking party to show relevancy, nonavail-
ability of alternative sources, or a compelling or overriding
interest. The court is not instructed, upon a requisite showing,
to use its discretion to require the production of the identity of
the source or the information.2 3 To the contrary, the statute
specifies that "information obtained in violation of the provi-
sions" is incompetent.2 9
of news to the public, by which he is professionally employed or otherwise associ-
ated in a news gathering capacity notwithstanding that the material or identity of
a source of such material or related material gathered by a person described above
performing a function described above is or is not highly relevant to a particular
inquiry of government and notwithstanding that the information was not solicited
by the journalist or newscaster prior to disclosure to him.
(c) Any information obtained in violation of the provisions of this section shall be
inadmissible in any action or proceeding or hearing before any agency.
(d) No fine or imprisonment may be imposed against a person for any refusal to
disclose information privileged by the provisions of this section.
Id.
235.
It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be
sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the
law is within the constitutional authority of the law-making body which passed it,
the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
236. W.P. STATSKY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS AND DRAFTING 75 (2d ed. 1984).
237. See supra note 234.
238. See supra note 234. Neither the Branzburg test nor a modification is written
into the statute. But cf. Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2214(A)(2), (4) (Supp. 1985); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4323 (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.024 (West Supp. 1988); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21.3 (West Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506(B)(2) (1980); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-3 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980). See supra notes 84-86
and accompanying text.




There is no provision in the New York statute that waives
the privilege upon publication of either the identity of the
source or of the contents of the information2 40 Those state legis-
latures that intended to waive the privilege upon disclosure of
the. identity of the source, the information, or both, expressly
stated these qualifications in the terms of the statute.24 1 Simi-
larly, there is no requirement set forth in the language of the
New York statute that requires a confidential relationship to ex-
ist either through an explicit or implicit understanding.2 2 How-
ever, three states expressly include a requirement of confidenti-
ality when such was the intention of the legislature.2
B. Legislative Intent
There was no ambiguity as to the intent of the sponsors of
the New York Shield Law. The letter and spirit of the original
shield law were well expressed by Governor Rockefeller when he
described New York as being
the only state that clearly protects the public's right to know and
the First Amendment rights of all legitimate newspapermen, re-
porters and television and radio broadcasters.
A representative democracy, such as ours, cannot exist unless
there is a free press both willing and able to keep the public in-
formed of all the news.244
The Governor also reiterated that the statute, as approved, pro-
vided a "stronger safeguard of the free channels of news commu-
nication" by protecting newsmen from compulsory disclosure of
their sources and the information they obtained in the news
gathering process.24 5 Governor Rockefeller also emphatically
noted that this statute provided greater protection than most
other existing legislation.246 Clearly, the reasoning behind the
original enactment of the statute displays a "firm conviction" to
240. See supra note 234.
241. See, e.g., supra note 82 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 234.
243. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.






protect news media personnel from forcibly having to disclose
"any information, material, or sources. '247 Nowhere in the legis-
lative history is the privilege qualified either by conditions im-
posed on the seeking party or a cloak of confidentiality. 248
The subsequent amendments to the New York Shield Law
were the legislature's responses to the judiciary's interpretation
of the statute, and had as their purpose the clarification of the
Shield Law against prior misconstruction.2 49 The sponsor of the
1981 amendment posited that the amendment was the definitive
statement that the legislature will not allow
the courts ... [to] arrogate to themselves the power to pierce the
absolute privilege of confidentiality for journalists so intended by
the Legislature .... It is in the interests of society as a whole
that the Legislature mandate absolutely and without qualification
the protection of journalists from being compelled to produce in-
formation or reveal sources.25
Assemblyman Sanders believed that the interest of society in
maintaining an "independent free press" outweighed the incon-
venience occasioned by the failure of the press to disclose infor-
mation in its possession, even when there is a compelling inter-
est in having the information revealed. 51
C. Judicial Error
It is well established that courts should look to the particu-
lar statutory language and apply its most obvious and natural
meaning. Lower courts in New York have incorrectly read
247. Knight-Ridder Broadcasting Co. v. Greenberg, 70 N.Y.2d 151, 163, 511 N.E.2d
1116, 1123, 518 N.Y.S.2d 595, 602 (1986) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
248. Id.
249. See supra notes 116-124 and accompanying text.
250. Sanders Memorandum, supra note 118, at 257-58. The legislative intent did not
require the reporter to explicitly establish a confidential relationship with his source; the
absolute privilege deemed one to exist. See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.022 (West Supp.
1988); see supra note 72 and accompanying text.
251. Sanders Memorandum, supra note 118, at 258.
252. See, e.g., Monarch Elec. Contr. Corp. v. Roberts, 70 N.Y.2d 91, 97, 510 N.E.2d
795, 798, 517 N.Y.S.2d 711, 714 (1987) (where statute is unambiguous, its plain meaning
must be applied); Capital Newspapers v. Whalen, 69 N.Y.2d 246, 251, 505 N.E.2d 932,
935, 513 N.Y.S.2d 367, 370 (1987) ("It is fundamental that in interpreting a statute, a
court should look first to the particular words in question ...."); Price v. Price, 69




confidentiality into a statute that contains no qualification on its
face.253 In People v. Korkala,54 the appellate division held that
no "absolute privilege" was created by the 1981 amendment. 55
The Korkala court did not rely on the language of the Shield
Law,256 but instead relied on the prior decisional law that "such
privilege may be invoked only after there has been established
an express or implied agreement of confidentiality. '257 The
Korkala court then addressed the legislative intent behind the
1981 amendment and held that the cloak of confidentiality re-
quirement was not dispensed with because the specific provision
that would have eliminated confidentiality as a requirement was
deleted from the final version of the bill.2 58 The appellate divi-
sion, having denied an absolute privilege under the Shield Law,
proceeded to uphold the mandatory production of outtakes for
in camera inspection on the basis that the qualified privilege of
the first amendment would apply only if the three elements of
the Branzburg test could not be satisfied. 59
The majority in Knight-Ridder based its construction on
the failure of the legislature to change the law in the face of the
narrow judicial construction. The appellate division had rea-
soned that the 1981 amendments did not eliminate the judicially
imposed cloak of confidentiality because the legislature did not
specifically incorporate a provision that would expressly abolish
that requirement.2 While the third department recognized the
indicate a contrary intent, terms of general import will ordinarily be given their full sig-
nificance without limitation.").
253. See supra notes 127-130, 133, 139-142, and accompanying text.
254. 99 A.D.2d 161, 472 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1st Dep't 1984). For facts of Korkala, see
supra notes 162-163.
255. Korkala, 99 A.D.2d at 165, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
256. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1988).
257. Korkala, 99 A.D.2d at 166, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 313 (relying on Hennigan v. Buffalo
Courier Express Co., 85 A.D.2d 924, 446 N.Y.S.2d 767 (4th Dep't 1981), and Oak Beach
Inn Corp. v. Babylon Beacon, 92 A.D.2d 102, 459 N.Y.S.2d 819 (2d Dep't 1983)).
258. Id. at 165-66, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 313. "Although such deletion does not conclu-
sively establish the intent of the legislature .... such rejection of a specific statutory
provision is a significant consideration when divining legislative intent." Id. at 166, 472
N.Y.S.2d at 313.
259. Id. at 167-68, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 314. The appellate division could not apply the
three-prong Branzburg test on the basis of the New York Shield Law since it is not
written into the statute. See supra note 234. Therefore, Korkala had to be decided as a
first amendment issue.




broad language of the recent New York Court of Appeals deci-
sion in Beach v. Shanley,261 which stated that "the Shield Law
provides a broad protection to journalists without any qualifying
language,'"62 the appellate court in Knight-Ridder refused to
"apply such broad language . . . to abolish the confidentiality
requirement that has long been read into the statute by the
courts of this State. Such action is more appropriately left to the
Legislature." 2' 3 But the legislature's omission of a provision
which expressly stated that nonconfidential information should
be protected should not be used as the basis for construing the
statute as requiring confidentiality; "such deletion does not con-
clusively establish the intent of the legislature .. .and while
preenactment statements properly may be taken into considera-
tion . . . [those statements] are by no means conclusive. "284
Relying on this omission as a failure of the legislature to
speak to the confidentiality requirement is a misinterpretation
of legislative history. The wording of the provision was changed
because of the desire of its sponsor to propose an absolute law.
There was no rejection of any version of the bill by either com-
mittee or by the legislature. Neither the legislature, nor any
committee turned down any proposal regarding the Shield Law.
At no time was there any action of the legislature from which to
read legislative intent. The bill memorandum by Assemblyman
Sanders, the sponsor, never changed, and accordingly, most sup-
porting memoranda discussed the absoluteness of the provi-
sion. Even the court of appeals decision asserts that the public
policy of the legislature should not be circumscribed by the judi-
ciary's view of what that policy should be .26 But, according to
the dissent,
[t]he majority's holding produces a classic irony. New York
State's judiciary, which should be the bastion of protection of this
right afforded by the elected representatives of the people of this
261. 62 N.Y.2d 241, 465 N.E.2d 304, 476 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1984).
262, Id. at 251, 465 N.E.2d at 310, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 771.
263. Knight-Ridder Broadcasting v. Greenberg, 119 A.D.2d 68, 72, 505 N.Y.S.2d 368,
371 (3d Dep't 1986).
264. Korkala, 99 A.D.2d at 166, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
265. Telephone interview with Stephen Kaufman, Special Assistant to Assembly-
man Sanders (Feb. 8, 1988). See also Sanders Memorandum, supra note 116.




State, instead chills that right by inserting its own confidentiality
clause into an unqualified statute. Their holding may be reduced
to this syllogism: (1) the lower courts put confidentiality into the
statute; (2) the judiciary then says that the Legislature did not
take it out; and (3) the judiciary finally declares that the Legisla-
ture put it in in the first place.267
However, it is evident that the purpose of the legislature was to
enact an absolute law.
According to the Bellacosa dissent, the majority has substi-
tuted the word "some" for "any," thereby enabling the judiciary
to read a qualification into the statute. 268 The word "any" in the
statute implies no limitations. Other states construe their stat-
utes without limits on the word "any." In Grand Forks Herald
v. District Court,269 the North Dakota Supreme Court found its
shield law to be unambiguous and not limited to the disclosure
of confidential sources by the words "'any information or the
source of any information' obtained by a news gatherer. '2 70 Im-
position of a requirement of confidentiality would be contrary to
the intent and wording of the statute.171 "When the wording of a
statute is clear and free of all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to
be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. '272 The
New York Shield Law, written in similar terms, refers to "any
news or the source of any news. 2 73 It is unlimited and unquali-
fied on its face.
The majority in Knight-Ridder also dismissed the first
amendment claim on the basis of the Branzburg test, finding
that the taped interview contained relevant information neces-
sary to a grand jury investigation that was unavailable from
other sources. 274 The Branzburg decision, however, did not pre-
267. Id. at 161, 511 N.E.2d at 1122, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 601 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 161, 511 N.E.2d at 1121, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 600-01.
269. 322 N.W.2d 850 (N.D. 1982).
270. Id. at 854 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976)).
271. Id. at 854.
272. Id. See also Austin v. Memphis Pub. Co., 655 S.W.2d 146, 150 (Tenn. 1983).
The Tennessee Supreme Court overturned an appellate decision which construed the
Shield Law as limiting the phrase "'any information or the source of any information
procured for publication or broadcast'" only to circumstances of confidentiality. Id. (cit-
ing TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980)).
273. See supra note 234.




clude a state from enacting its own shield law, nor its courts
from deciding its cases on the basis of the state law.1 5 The New
York Court of Appeals could have quashed the subpoena under
section 79-h of the New York Civil Rights Law.
The judiciary has retreated from a trend of recognizing a
more expansive approach to the privilege afforded under the
statute. The trial courts began this trend between the enactment
of the 1981 amendment and the court of appeals decision in
Beach in 1984, determining that the legislature "never did en-
cumber the plain protections afforded by the statute even in its
original enactment. '2 76 With the Knight-Ridder decision, how-
ever, the majority has curtailed this more expansive approach.
The majority has, in effect, reversed its decision in Beach, where
the court relied on the plain meaning of the statute and the leg-
islative intent behind the original enactment and subsequent
amendments, to hold that "the Shield Law provides a broad
protection to journalists without any qualifying language. '' 77
V. Conclusion
The New York Shield Law was intended to be an unambig-
uous and strong law. Had the legislature wanted to impose limi-
tations on the scope of the journalists' privilege, it could have
expressly added qualifications in the language of the statute, as
did its counterparts in other states that require either confiden-
tiality or a formulation of the Branzburg test.18 The intent of
275. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972).
276. Knight-Ridder, 70 N.Y.2d at 165, 511 N.E.2d at 1124, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 603
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting). See, e.g., People v. Iannacone, 112 Misc. 2d 1057, 447
N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982) (reporter's motion to quash subpoena for his
notes for forthcoming article granted even though interviews were conducted without
promise of confidentiality); Wilkins v. Kalla, 118 Misc. 2d 34, 459 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1983) (outtakes, notes, and other nonbroadcast materials held absolutely
privileged under the broad and pervasive protection of the Shield Law); CBA Elecs. v.
Ellenberg, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1095 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Dec. 9, 1983) (Shield Law pro-
vides absolute protection against disclosure for both confidential and nonconfidential in-
formation). But cf. Hennigan v. Buffalo Courier Express Co., 85 A.D.2d 924, 446
N.Y.S.2d 767 (4th Dep't 1981) and People v. Korkala, 99 A.D.2d 161, 472 N.Y.S.2d 310
(1st Dep't 1984) (appellate division continued to require confidentiality in order to claim
the privilege). For a discussion of Hennigan, see supra notes 154-167 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of Korkala, see supra notes 160-163 and accompanying text.
277. Beach, 62 N.Y.2d at 251, 465 N.E.2d at 310, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 771.




the legislature is clear. "[T]he Nation's principal center of news
gathering and dissemination "279 requires a strong statute that
grants its privilege without qualifications. This is what the New
York Legislature has given us.
But the judiciary, based on a negative implication, has con-
tinued to read a cloak of confidentiality into the privilege.28 0 The
rules of statutory construction are clear. The statute must be
read in light of its plain meaning, before the judiciary attempts
to divine legislative intent.2 81 Where there is no ambiguity, the
statute is to be enforced as written.2 82 The legislature has at-
tempted to correct judicial misinterpretation by two prior
amendments, each intended to strengthen the Shield Law.2 3
Nevertheless, the New York Court of Appeals has failed to fol-
low the lead of the state's lower courts toward a broad interpre-
tation of New York Civil Rights Law section 79-h.2 84
New York, a stronghold of the news media, needs a strong
shield law. Perhaps it is time for the legislature to defuse the
controversy that has raged over this statute since the time of its
enactment. The legislature has only to include a confidentiality
requirement or a Branzburg test to qualify the privilege in crim-
inal proceedings. It seems, however, that the legislature's persis-
tence in not including these elements should lead the judiciary
to the conclusion that the New York Shield Law, by design,
grants an absolute privilege. Since the judiciary has not reached
this conclusion, it is now time for the legislature to state un-
equivocally that the privilege extends to both confidential and
nonconfidential information. To fail to do so is to abandon the
legislature's obligation to safeguard the unfettered rights of a
free press.28
Shelley R. Halber
279. Governor's Memorandum, supra note 109, at 508.
280. See supra notes 152-166 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 235.
282. See supra note 236.
283. See supra notes 116-124 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 167, 172, 175, and accompanying text.
285. Assemblyman Steven Sanders is currently sponsoring an amendment to the
New York Shield Law which will definitively include nonconfidential information within
the protection of the statute. In his supporting statement, Assemblyman Sanders avowed




of news communication" and in effect would reverse the Knight-Ridder decision. GOVER-
NOR'S PROGRAM BILL 139 (1988). The proposed language is very specific. Journalists and
newscasters would be protected from contempt proceedings "for failing to disclose any
news, whether or not obtained under agreement of confidentiality ...." GOVERNOR'S
PROGRAM BILL 139 to amend N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b) (emphasis in original).
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